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THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION AND HOME
RULE FOR CHICAGO
BAPXT HoDEs*AMONG the inequities that have arisen out of state government
under the Illinois' Constitution of 1870 is the almost complete
Ilack of self-governing powers in the city of Chicago. It takes but
a homely example to illustrate Chicago's lack of legal power to cope with
its everyday problems.
Some years ago, the Law Department of the city of Chicago was re-
quested to submit an opinion' on the city's power to establish an auto-
mobile pound for motor vehicles which have been abandoned, parked il-
legally, or operated by intoxicated drivers. The closest specific grant of
power that could be found, was a statutory provision permitting the city
to "prohibit the running at large of horses, asses, mules, cattle, swine,
sheep, goats, geese, and dogs .....
A marked lag has developed between the requirements of an efficiently
functioning municipal government and the existing municipal law. The
city of Chicago has been compelled to engage in endless struggles to se-
cure enabling legislation from the state. Protracted and costly litigation
has been necessary to keep grants once obtained. All this symbolizes, in a
manner with which every city official has become only too familiar, the
complete break between the real problems which confront city dwellers
today and the political-legal mythology within which municipal govern-
ment must function.
In spite of the concentration of sovereign power in the states and the
widespread denial of self-government to the cities, the fact is that 56 out
of every ioo Americans now live in cities of 2,500 population or more.
More than 84 per cent of these city dwellers-or nearly half of our total
population-live in metropolitan areas, that is, in cities of at least 50,ooo
inhabitants and their suburbs. In these metropolitan areas are located the
great industrial plants and commercial enterprises which have made our
civilization the most productive and powerful in human annals. Urban
dwellers produce approximately 73 per cent of the nation's annual income
* Member of the Illinois Bar; formerly Corporation Counsel of the city of Chicago and
member of the Illinois State Tax Commission.
18 Op. of Corp. Coun. 412, No. 751 (1929-35); ibid., at 668, No. 7244.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) C. 24, § 23-85.
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and pay more than 9o per cent of all taxes collected by the federal, state,
and local governments combined.
If the cities are so populous and powerful economically, how does it
happen that they are so impotent legally? The answer is simply that rural
interests have managed to retain control of our state legislatures by a re-
fusal to redistrict the states as provided by their state constitutions and
by the use of various gerrymandering techniques of districting the states
to their advantage. If there is any large city or metropolitan area which is
permitted to elect its fair share of state legislators, it is unknown to this
writer.3
Agriculturally interested minorities dominate our state legislatures,
because they dominated them when our state governments were first es-
tablished and have since refused to relinquish their control. When our
federal government became a going concern in 1789, nearly 95 per cent of
the population lived on farms or in rural communities. The largest city in
the thirteen original states was Philadelphia with a population of 28,522.
The founding fathers, therefore, had reason to believe they could safely
entrust the people's rights to the sovereign states which were dominated
by agricultural interests. Even Tocqueville in his famous description of
Democracy in America4 neglected to describe our city governments be-
cause he regarded our cities as complete departures from the American
social norm.5
Consequently, the development of the modern city has not been coupled
with a corresponding development of municipal legal powers. Our cities
enjoy only such powers as the states which create them choose to confer
upon them. This anomalous situation is based on concepts of government
3Cook County, which corresponds roughly with metropolitan Chicago, has more than half
of the population of the state. Yet it has been permitted to elect only 57 of the '53 members of
the lower house and i9 of the 5o state senators. Even the new redistricting act fails to give
Cook and Lake Counties adequate representation in the state legislature. New York City, with
6o per cent of the state's population, is apportioned only 62 of the i~o assembly members and
23 of the 5i state senators. Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, St. Louis, Cleveland, and
Detroit are further notorious examples of partial disfranchisement by the rural-controlled
states.
4Tooke, Progress of Local Government, i836-1936 (i937).
s Tocqueville and the founding fathers could afford to ignore the cities because only 20o,ooo
of the then 3,929,214 American people lived in them. There were, in fact, no cities in the
modern sense, and urban problems existed only in the speculations of philosophers like Thomas
Jefferson who feared that cities might eventually develop as a threat to democratic government.
In one sense, Jefferson's worst fears were realized; for metropolitan New York has the largest
urban population in the world-x,6go,Sio-or nearly three times the population of the entire
United States at the time the Constitution was adopted. In another sense, Jefferson's fears
were quite misplaced, for the gravest assault on democratic government today comes not
from the cities, but is leveled by the country folk on the cities in refusing to permit representa-
tion on the basis of population as guaranteed by both federal and state constitutions.
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which hark back to' our agricultural forebears and are embalmed with
time-defying permanence in our federal and state constitutions. No city
government, therefore, can hold rentals or prices down one mill without a
specific grant of authority from the state. And what is true of rent control
is true of nearly every other function of local government from operating
a municipal airport to running a municipal zoo.
Out of the hundreds of cases to which reference may be made, only a
few more examples of the social and political schizophrenia which splits
the city from the legal power it needs to function effectively in our atomic
age need be cited.
As a step toward clearing its blighted areas, Chicago, like other Ameri-
can cities in twenty-three different states, established a local commission
under authority of the state neighborhood redevelopment act. However,
the Illinois state legislature refused to permit insurance companies to ac-
quire capital stock in redevelopment corporations or to permit tax exemp-
tions or tax reductions, thus rendering this typ5e of investment so unat-
tractive to private capital as to render the act quite unworkable.6
In this instance, no lack of technical knowledge or financial ability was
involved; for the Illinois General Assembly had before it the example of
the New York State Development Act, which grants partial exemption to
developers and permits investment and stock control by insurance com-
panies. As a result, ioooo dwelling units were reported under construc-
tion in New York City in 1946 under the Neighborhood Redevelopment
Act, in contrast to none in Chicago. Other successful housing develop-
ments whose examples failed to influence the Illinois state legislators are
under way in Los Angeles and San Francisco. Chicago's lack of home rule
powers and the necessary cooperation of its parent state thus automati-
cally foredoom to failure any practical attempt to come to grips with the
housing problem.
The city of Chicago also finds itself in a grave financial dilemma. Yet
Chicago's real estate property tax is disproportionately high, because the
city is still dependent for the bulk of its revenue on this antiquated tax,
supplemented by the inequitable, hard-to-administer personal property
tax and various license and permit fees. Recently, it is true, the city was
voted authority to levy a local sales tax. The fact, however, that the State
of Illinois has practically pre-empted this field of taxation by its 2 per cent
retailers' occupational tax and that any additional sales tax would require
approval by public referendum leaves this measure obviously nothing but
a political sham.
Other American cities have been able to solve their financial dilemmas
6 See Chicago's Law Year 2o-i (1946); also Chicago's Law Year 21-2 (1945). ,
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by means of local sales, income, and payroll taxes, by taxes on cigarettes,
tobacco, consumers' utility and water bills, and by new or increased license
fees for operating amusement enterprises, taxicabs, and other types of
businesses. However, the archaic revenue section of our state constitution
plus the hidebound resistance of the state legislature toward giving Chi-
cago home-rule revenue powers or sharing with it state-collected taxes
leaves the city completely helpless to meet a potential deficit for 1947 of
some $9,ooo,ooo.7
In 1946 the American Municipal Association listed forty-three states as
sharing state-collected taxes with their cities. The only tax thus shared by
the State of Illinois is one-third of the motor fuel tax, or about $6,ooo,ooo
a year. New York's Moore plan, by contrast, provided for a return to the
cities in 1946 of more than $87,ooo,ooo in state-collected taxes as well as
other forms of local assistance, bringing the total of local state-aid to
$307,000,000.
Chicago's complete legal impotence and its corresponding dependence
on Springfield for enabling legislation results in the needless expenditure
of a great deal of the city government's effort in wheedling, threatening,
bargaining, and other political maneuvering. Mayor Kennelly's failure to
induce Governor Green to permit the state legislature to share a twelfth
of state-collected taxes with Chicago shows the futility of attempting to
pit moral pressure, statistics, and logic against the cruder form of politics
in IIYnois today.
Furthermore, although city-dwellers are called upon to pay 9o per cent
of all federal and state taxes, no state legislature has so far been willing to
leave entirely up to their judgment just how these taxes are to be assessed
and levied. In Illinois, as in most other states, the legislature demands that
the vassal cities derive the bulk of their local revenue from real property
taxes. Usually this is augmented by taxes on personal property. Both these
archaic methods of raising revenue are dear to the hearts of rural legisla-
tors. Both had their origin in colonial days, when practically everyone
lived on a farm. In 1776 a citizen's wealth consisted mainly of land, farm
buildings, and livestock. At that time the value of one's tangible property
was a fair measure of one's wealth and ability to pay. The property tax
had the added advantage that one could scarcely hide a farm or herd of
cattle from the tax assessor. Today, when most city wealth is represented
in stocks, bonds, and other intangibles-safely tucked away in bank
vaults-these taxes are both unfair and difficult to collect. The states' in-
7 Studies conducted by the Research Division of the Law Department indicate that
Chicago's per capita municipal expenditures are among the lowest of any large city in the
United States.
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sistence that cities employ property taxes has loaded urban real estate
with such a crushing tax burden that millions of property owners have
moved into the suburbs, selling their city buildings or permitting them to
deteriorate into slums.
Not content with limiting cities to the archaic, unjust property tax for
the bulk of their revenues, the state joins the federal government in high-
handedly exempting extensive classes of property from local taxation be-
cause of their religious, educational, charitable, or governmental charac-
ter.
State laws tell the cities not only how to raise their own revenue but how
to spend it. To operate its own traction system, for instance, took years of
political campaigning on the part of the city government merely to ac-
quire the requisite authority from the state of Illinois. No matter what
the emergency, the city of Chicago can make no expenditure not pro-
vided for in its annual appropriation bill. This last is a complicated budg-
et, setting up separate funds for specific purposes in accordance with state
laws. It is required by the state so that, even in spending its own money
for state-approved purposes, the city may not transfer funds or deviate
from the maximum sums or percentages fixed by the state for each local
function.
Before any American municipality can issue a single bond, it must first
secure permission from the state. Usually, then, it must secure approval
of the bond issue by popular referendum. If a taxpayer chooses to test the
"constitutionality" of the bond issue, the municipality must engage in a
long and costly lawsuit to prove that the money will be used for legitimate
local purposes.
A drastic revision of our archaic taxing laws would require the adop-
tion of a new state constitution or extensive amendment of the present
Revenue Article. The statutory provision that only one amendment to the
constitution may be voted on at a time and that it must receive a majori-
ty of all votes cast at the election makes the chance of amending our
Revenue Article appear infinitesimal. Attempts to facilitate this amend-
ing process through the use of "party circles" on ballots and by adoption
of a "gateway amendment" seem equally hopeless today.8
A corps of city legal experts is engaged in constant litigation to pro-
tect those meager powers the city manages to wrest from the state. To
establish the constitutionality of the amendment to the Cities and Vil-
lages Act giving municipalities the power to condemn property for slum
clearance purposes and to test the validity of an ordinance authorizing the
8 Sears, Constitutional Revision and Party Circle Bills, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 200 (X947).
HOME RULE FOR CHICAGO
issuance of $5,000,000 in slum clearance bonds, it was necessary for the
Law Department to secure a favorable ruling from the State Supreme
Court through quo warranto proceedings. 9 The city's power to license
homes for the aged also had to be defended in prolonged litigation. In
Father Basil's Lodge, Inc. v. Chicago,z° the State Supreme Court ultimately
held that the ordinances involved were health and safety regulations and,
therefore, constituted police regulations which are within the power of the
city to enact and enforce under Article 23 of the Revised Cities and Vil-
lages Act. Such proceedings are costly, lengthy, and prejudicial to innova-
tion of any kind. Yet they are a necessary, routine activity of Chicago's
Law Department.
Although in the above two instances the city was victorious, in other
cases it is only too evident that while the city council or state legislature
may propose, the state courts will dispose. In the case of Chicago v. Stone,""
a city court had fined a storekeeper $i00.00 for purchasing a trumpet from
a minor without consent of the minor's parents or guardian, which action
constituted a violation of the Municipal Code. On appeal, however, the
appellate court ruled that the city of Chicago lacked the power to adopt
the ordinance under which the defendant was convicted. The court held
that under Section 23-94 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act, the city
was authorized only to issue licenses and regulate secondhand stores doing
business similar to a "dealer in junk and rags." The defendant's store did
not come within this precise category.
On such a comparatively simple matter as licensing juke boxes, the city
had to enact a new ordinance, reducing the annual license fee from $50.00
to $25.o0, because the original ordinance was held invalid by the State
Supreme Court on the ground that a $50.00 fee was "exorbitant."1I2
Even when the city has been permitted to set up an agency such as the
Civil Service Commission, a state court verdict may neutralize the com-
mission's power. For instance, when nine police captains were suspended
in 1943 for alleged failure to suppress gambling in their districts, they took
their case into the courts, with the result that the Superior Court, later
upheld by the appellate court in People ex rel Cartan v. Gregory,'3 entered
judgment quashing the record of the Civil Service Commission.
9 The People ex rel. Tuohy v. City of Chicago, 394 Ill. 477, 68 N.E. 2d 761 (1946).
'0393 Ill. 246, 65 N.E. 2d 8o5 (z946).
x'328 Ill. App. 345, 66 N.E. 2d ioo (1946).
" Lamere v. City of Chicago, 391 Ill. 552, 63 N.E. 2d 863 (1945); City of Chicago v. Kay,
282 Ill. App. 604 (1935).
x3 329 Ill. App. 307, 68 N.E. 2d 193 (1946), noted in 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 270 (1947).
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Every Corporation Counsel of the city of Chicago soon learns that no
city service may be performed by the city without the prior consent of the
state. Such diverse and special problems as the regulation of toy guns,
punishment for deceptive advertising, signatures on birth certificates, and
streetcar facilities on certain city thoroughfares-all these purely local
matters are determined by the state.' 4
Chicago is also a legal infant in the field 'of police powers. When a
drivers' license law to compel examination of drivers was passed by the
Chicago City Council in 19o4, it was declared void by our state courts for
lack of authority.' s Periodic testing by the city of auto brakes, lights, and
other equipment was suggested in 193i, but could not be imposed until a
state statute had been enacted in 19356 Even the type of automobile
headlights permitted in Chicago could not be determined by the city ex-
cept in accordance with rules established by a department of the state of
flhinois.'V Nor can the city inspect the automobiles of nonresidents, in-
cluding suburbanites who use Chicago streets. 8 A state law exempts
trucks from periodic inspection of mechanical equipment, thus hindering
the city from undertaking any comprehensive regulation of commercial
vehicles. The City Council lacks power to determine speed limits on city
streets or even the prima facie speed in alleys.' 9 When the city requested
the passage of a law providing for the use of distinctive letters on license
plates to designate residence in different sections of the state, the state
legislature refused to adopt it.2° When the city sought to impound the
cars of intoxicated drivers, it found it was powerless to do so because this
would constitute a punishment not specified by state law.21
Perhaps the prize instance of municipal impotence to come to my at-
tention as Corporation Counsel was the effort of the city's Chief Electrical
Inspector to stop the sale of an electrical device presenting a life hazard.
This device was an electrical mouse trap which electrocutes the mouse,
then throws the.body clear of the trap. Despite the hazard to life involved
in the use of this trap, the Law Department had to rule that the city had
been given no express authority from the state to license the sale of elec-
14 Department of Law Report 9-io (1940).
Is City of Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94 (1904).
16 x8 Op. of Corp. Con. 413, No. 7367 (I929-35); Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) C. 952, § 260.
17 2o Op. of Corp. Coun. 228, No. 10155 (1938-40).
s 2 0 Op. of Corp. Coun. 230, No. 9859 (i938-4o).
'9 2O Op. of Corp. Con. 201, N o. 10277 (1940-43).
20 Chicago Council journal 4844-45 (193o-3).
X i9 Op. of Corp. Coun. io9, No. 9197 (1936-37).
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trical appliances. The Chief Inspector was within his rights in expressing
his views concerning the appliance to the manufacturers, the vendor, and
the public. But he could take no positive action to prevent human injury.22
Chicago's ability to benefit from the federal aid program for municipal
airports and hospitals also is dependent purely on the future cooperation
of the state of Illinois. The federal government's program provides for al-
location of $75,ooo,ooo a year for five years to meet one-third the cost of
constructing state and local public and non-profit hospitals. However, no
federal aid may be extended to any municipality without approval by
both the Public Health Service and a special state agency. Applications
for federal assistance may be submitted by municipalities if not prevented
by state law.23 Had the federal and state governments granted our cities'
sufficient control over their own revenues, the cities could have solved
their own problems without the roundabout method of "federal aid." The
fact is that during the depression, as in normal times, the cities are milked
by both federal and state governments, supplying the bulk of cash and
wealth needed to support our complicated federal-state structure.
During the war, the legal inability of our cities to defend themselves or
to take emergency action without first winning appropriate permission
from the state, frightened not only responsible local officials but top exec-
utives of our federal government responsible for the nation's defense. By
a brilliant piece of legal obfuscation, the Office of Civilian Defense was al-
lowed to establish both New York and metropolitan Chicago as "states."
Had they remained in their ordinary city status, the hostility, jealousy,
delay, and red tape involved in dealing through their state governments
would have rendered them as effective in an air raid or invasion as the
Ladies Sodality in a like emergency.
During the war, the Chicago city administration foresightedly laid
plans for extensive postwar reforms, including public ownership of its
traction system, redevelopment of its blighted areas, the establishment of
a municipal port authority modeled after that of New York City, and
amendment of the Revenue Article. In order to secure the necessary au-
thority from the state legislature, the Democratic party leader traveled
to the state capital and reached-as he thought-an agreement with the
head of the Republican state party.
However, this temporary political coalition was attacked with such
bitterness by party die-hards that both the municipal port authority and
the tax reform measures were voted down. As a consequence, Chicago
suffered a major defeat in its attempt to deal intelligently with two of its
=Chicago's Law Year 56-7 (1946). 23 Chicago's Law Year x7 (1946).
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biggest postwar problems. No Illinois community outside Chicago would
have been affected one way or the other by how Chicago proposed to
operate its port facilities or finance its own municipal operations. But be-
cause of a hostility to large cities which has its counterpart in every state
legislature in the land, not only must Chicago struggle along with its pres-
ent inadequate terminal facilities, but it faces a financial crisis.
Without independent political power, the financial and administrative
outlook of our metropolitan cities, particularly of Chicago, is bound to
become more and more desperate. As one who has been intimately con-
cerned with municipal activities, I have reluctantly come to the conclu-
sion that nothing short of drastic political action can wrest this power
from our states. For that reason it has been said by municipal authorities
that our best hope lies in strengthening the urban-federal relations begun
in the form of federal grants-in-aid during the depression and strengthened
during the war. This new partnership, it is urged, between Washington
and the home town has already brought federal post-war aid to our
cities for public housing, municipal airports, public hospitals, arterial
highways, and city planning. Against the extension of this suggested
partnership, a bitter rear-action fight by our states can be foreseen-par-
ticularly Illinois-to preserve every bit of their ancient rights and preroga-
tives. A municipal rebellion to counteract this opposition has been called
for by some municipal experts. A vital objective of this struggle should be
to establish urban autonomy within every state in the union or to estab-
lish our metropolitan areas as separate, independent, sovereign city-
states.
Our cities need independent power. They need a position in our federal
structure other than that of mere creature of the state. As a start-and
only a start-they need a Secretary of Urban Affairs in the President's
cabinet, with a streamlined Department of Urban Affairs to deal with
urban problems and to coordinate the operations in metropolitan areas of
our urban and federal governments. They need expert counsel, as well as
legal authority, to reorganize, expand, and cooperate with other local gov-
ernments to meet changing urban conditions. Eventually they need an
amendment to our Constitution which will give them sovereignty in the
whole field of metropolitan affairs comparable to that now reserved to our
states.
Granted such a municipal billof rights, American cities could use their
economic wealth and power, their technical and cultural resources, to
solve not only their own pressing problems but to help rural America
achieve a better and more prosperous life.
